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THE ITALIAN WAGE CURVE.
THE EFFECTS  
OF THE RECENT LABOUR MARKET REFORMS  
di Nadia Netti*
1. Introduction  
The reforms taken in the 1990s aimed at increasing flexibility in the Ital-
ian labour market to respond to the “inclusion” problem which still charac-
terises the country. New temporary low-skill jobs were created but neither 
industrial competitiveness nor productivity were enforced. 
As far as the Mezzogiorno is concerned, not enough was done to re-
move the obstacles that induce firms to a downsize. This process is the 
main source of persistent local unemployment, only “mitigated” by a dra-
matic increase in the outgoing labour force phenomena (i.e. discouraged 
workers, migrants towards more developed areas of the country or abroad 
and occupational deaths).  
As documented by the Svimez (2007) the development of the Mezzog-
iorno is still severely compromised by a hostile territory with social insecu-
rity and a high crime rate (obviously increased by the “inclusion” problem 
in the labour market); lacking in infrastructure (namely roads, railways 
lines, airports, ports, …) and services (schools, hospitals, …); scarce diffu-
sion of technology and services for firms; credit rationing (reinforced by 
the local effect of the new Basel Agreements). 
If these are the problems, it is difficult to understand how they could be 
solved, rather than consolidated, by the widespread insecurity produced by 
the recent reforms. Excessive turnover of workers and firms, reinforced by 
the recent reforms, is a major obstacle to human capital accumulation.  
A hostile territory produces social inequality, poverty, under-
consumption and under-investment that severely compromises growth. 
* I wish to thank Prof. A. Giannola for his very useful comments. Faculty of Economics, 
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One of the pretexts to implement labour market de-regulation was the 
non-existence of a wage curve in Italy (section 2). We present a theoretical 
insight into the wage curve (section 3). The empirical evolution of the sub-
ject as far as the Italian labour market is concerned is then presented. One 
of the questions we seek to ask is whether it is right to talk of a “resurrec-
tion” of the wage curve only after the July 1993 Income Policy Agreements 
(section 4). New results obtained on Capitalia’s database (2001-03) and 
Bank of Italy’s Survey of Italian Household Budgets (2002-2006) show 
what has occurred when the de-regulation is near completion (section 5).  
For an in-depth understanding of the effects of the reform, the new defi-
nitions in collecting labour force statistics and the distribution of unem-
ployment are analysed (section 6). Some severe shortcomings of de-
regulation such as the outgoing labour force phenomenon are then consid-
ered (par. 7). 
The recent Italian reform of business taxation has devoted attention to 
the fiscal wedge. It is widely claimed that the high fiscal wedge produces 
downward rigidity of wages and hence unemployment (section 8). On the 
contrary, the data show a severe downward drift of wages and a slight de-
crease in the fiscal wedge in Italy (section 9).  
In the conclusion (section 10) our point of view is restated: far from 
solving the problems of a dual economy, de-regulation of Italian labour 
market has reinforced them and has concurrently eroded civil rights thereby 
making a departure form standards of health and morality.  
2. Keywords, Clichés, Normalization Procedures and Resurrections 
As it is very ably described by Contini and Trivellato (2005), during the 
1990s, to create the conditions for labour market de-regulation, ad hoc cli-
chés were coined in part of the economic literature. Even econometricians 
were greatly influenced by such clichés that described, with very few ex-
ceptions, the Italian labour market as excessively rigid. With the consent of 
many (but not all) applied and theoretical economists, flexibility became 
the keyword of Italian policy, referring to both real wages and normative 
flexibility. 
Much of the effort spent in this ad-hoc direction could have been spent, 
more fruitfully, in the opposite direction.  
What does anybody do as soon as possible if they think they might have 
cancer? They go to more than one oncologist before any surgical operation. 
One of the first steps of the reform could have been to devote attention 
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and resources to detect the problem correctly. The inputs could have been 
unbiased data, trained collectors and applied researchers. On the contrary, 
inadequate databases and the excess proneness to rush decisions without 
challenging the theoretical mainstream produced the recent labour market 
de-regulation and its negative effects.  
Only recently, thanks to the “resurrection” of some observations that al-
ready existed but that were never considered at all, has it become clear that 
Italian labour market de-regulation has: 
x reduced incentives to human capital investment both for firms and 
workers;
x increased the inclusion problem, the outgoing labour force and migra-
tion phenomena, and the connected social problems; 
x increased labour market polarization, good versus bad jobs; 
x increased insecurity and occupational death phenomena.  
One “resurrection” was, for example, that of worker mobility. Contini 
and Trivellato (2005) asserted that worker mobility was already evident in 
the 1980’s. This phenomenon has only been recently detected thanks to the 
Work Histories Italian Panel (WHIP)1.
1 This note is completely drawn from (Leombruni, 2005) and http://www.laboratoriorevelli. 
it/whip. 
The Work Histories Italian Panel is the database of individual labour histories build by 
the private Centre for Employment Studies in Riccardo Revelli’s laboratory and mainly fi-
nanced by “Compagnia di San Paolo”. The database was made up on the base of the INPS 
Archives. The population from which the sample (1:90) is drawn is made of all the people 
(about 715,000) that have ever worked in Italy for a period of their life. Every kind of work-
ing experience is considered and even periods in which one as had unemployment benefits. 
Working experience such as employment in the public sector, self-employed with an 
autonomous pension fund, and irregular ones are excluded by WHIP.  
WHIP is a Linked-Employer-Employee Database rich in information relative to both 
firms and employees as data are drawn even from the INPS firm observatory (1987-1998). 
The period considered is from 1985 to 1999 and 1985-2004 for some variables. WHIP is 
seen as a black box which is the result of about one hundred programs performed to elabo-
rate the input represented by INPS data not directly useful for the purpose of research. The 
WHIP file standard is a half version of the full edition sample (1:180) made of anonymous 
microdata of 370,000 individuals.  
Some limits of WHIP: the definition of unemployment as it registers only cases of admin-
istrative unemployment as those of people with unemployment benefit. If it is no working ex-
perience nor benefits are registered, WHIP does not distinguish among unemployed or people 
outside the labour force or newly self-employed with an autonomous pension fund or entering 
the public sector, or entering the agriculture sector. Temporary flows among these four catego-
ries are always possible. 
1. firms data are available only for a shorter period (1987-1998); 
2. level of education is not available; 
3. some variables are available at a higher geographical than the provincial level; 
4.   some variables are available only for classes of firms rather than for single firms.
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Leombruni and Quaranta (2005) showed that labour mobility was already 
high in the early 1980s and it did not increase in the 1990s. Higher levels of 
mobility were particularly found in the Mezzogiorno, among young people, 
women, older marginal workers and recently in migrants workers. 
Again with the use of WHIP data, Devicienti et al. (2006) asserted that 
the 1993 Income Policy Agreement do succeeded in bringing back to life a 
wage curve in Italy. The Authors considered this a “resurrection” because 
Lucifora and Origo (1997, 1999) found no wage curve in the period 1980-
93, 1990-94, 1990-95 as far as the INPS database is concerned. However, 
the local unemployment elasticity of wages was negative and significant 
even in the period 1980-1994 in the case of ISTAT’s regional report (Luci-
fora and Origo, 1999).  
To tell the truth, and to overcome a “publication” bias, from Capitalia’s 
database2, the wage curve emerged in Italian manufacturing since 1989, 
that is well before the reforms cited, and persisted through the 1990s de-
spite the increasing weight of firms performance in explaining real wages 
paid (Netti, 1999a,b; 2001; 2006a,b).  
As regards the Bank of Italy’s Survey of Italian Household Budgets, the 
wage curve was absent in the earlier period 1977-91 (Manacorda and 
Petrongolo, 1999), but “resurrected”, for the whole economy, in the period 
1993-2000 (Netti, 2001, 2006a). 
Is it possible that such important phenomena were dissimulated with ad 
hoc data to justify the de-regulation of the labour market? 
This is the idea underlying the analysis of Contini and Trivellato (2005) 
and, earlier, of Ginzburg et al. (1998, 1999). The strange thing is that both 
observations are made about the INPS data. 
Another odd thing about the INPS database is the “turnabout” of the hi-
erarchical order of Italian provinces, with respect to wages differentials, 
that is noted to have happened in 1994 by Ginzburg et al. (1998, 1999). 
According to the same Authors this “turnabout” is not an effect of a struc-
tural break in the time series of territorial wages differentials that could be 
have been attributed to the Italian labour market reforms which occurred in 
19933. This phenomenon is, instead, produced by an intentional normaliza-
tion of wages performed by the INPS following a precise aim that involved 
government, firms and the INPS itself.  
In the same period, in fact, the ISTAT database went on to describe how 
large and positive were wage differentials existing between the North and the 
2 Formerly Mediocredito Centrale’s database. 
3 July 1993 Income Policy Agreements.
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South of the country in many of the industrial sectors. In the INPS database 
these differentials disappeared after the normalization performed in 1994. 
In particular, ISTAT’s regional accounts evidenced a North-South wage 
differential of about 25% in many sectors. Moreover, according to the Bank 
of Italy’s Survey of Italian Household Budgets, in 1995, manufacturing firms 
in the North paid about 12% higher wages than firms in the South. 
In 1994, Mediocredito Centrale’s database showed that small northern 
firms in manufacturing (less than 20 employees) paid about 30% higher 
wages than southern ones (Ginzburg et al., 1998, pp. 378, 382; Giannola, 
1998, p. 33, tab. 9). In 1995-97 the same database evidenced that wages 
paid by southern firms were about 20% lower than those paid by northern 
firms (Netti, 2001)4.
Below (tab. 1) we present the area wages differentials obtained with 
Capitalia’s database used for this paper. Deflated per-employee labour cost 
in manufacturing firms of the Mezzogiorno is still lower than that of the 
Centre-North with the exception of firms with 51-500 employees. Small 
northern firms in manufacturing (less than 20 employees) paid about 15% 
higher wages than southern firms. Northern firms with more than 500 em-
ployees paid about 30% higher wages than their southern counterparts. 
After their description of the kind of normalization characterising INPS 
data, Ginzburg et al. (1998, 1999), concluded that it was impossible to use 
normalised wages to perform whatever unbiased economic analysis5. The 
4 Manufacturing firms per-capita labour cost-Mezzogiorno as a percentage of Centre-North 
Firm size 
(no. employees)  1995 1996 1997 
11-20 74.1 79.8 78.7 
21-50 81.3 81.1 81.1 
51-100 80.7 77.1 78.5 
101-250 78.0 79.5 80.6 
251-500 81.6 82.4 85.7 
Oltre 500 76.5 78.4 80.5 
Totale 78.8 79.7 79.9 
Netti (2001) on Mediocredito Centrale’s database. 
5 This note is completely drawn from Ginzburg et al. (1998). 
Before 1994 the INPS collected unit pay as a ratio between total wages paid by a firm 
and annual mean value of its employees during the year. Firms correctly indicated in DM/10 
model the gross effective monthly pay but this procedure was considered wrong for it pro-
duces too low mean wages in presence of part-time workers, turnover and a number of days 
worked in a month lower than the standard. Those who had worked 22 days and 15 days a 
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“26 factor” (see footnote 6 for details) bias, produced by the normalization 
formula, was even worsened by the kind of national insurance contributions 
month were both considered work units. This induced the normalization procedure started in 
1994. Since 1994 in the INPS archive total normalized wages paid by a firm in a month have 
been calculated as follows: 
Ntmwi = Numwi * ei = [(Twi / Di) * 26] * ei
where: i = current month; ei = number of employees; 26 = maximum number of days pay-
able in each month; Ntmwi = Normalized total monthly wages; Numwi = Normalized unit
monthly pay = [(Twi / Di) * 26]; Twi = total monthly wages declared in DM/10; Di = number 
of working days declared in DM/10.  
Di is obtained conventionally dividing by 6.66 hours (which is an average working day) 
the total hours of work monthly declared by firms in the DM/10 model with the number of 
temporary workers and their hours of work. Annual normalized pay is then calculated divid-
ing the annual sum of normalized total monthly wages paid by the average annual number of 
employees (blue and white-collars). 
Effective wages paid would be equal to normalized ones only if there were always 26 
days paid in a month (i. e. the maximum available); but if this happened there would be no 
reason to normalize pays.  
Law 389/89 makes it mandatory for firms to declare (in DM/10 monthly models) a daily
pay not lower than minimal daily wages decided by law and collective bargaining (i.e. 
Cnldwi = daily wages consistent with collective national labour contract). 
The monthly pay declared is then submitted to the mandatory contribution that firms 
have to pay to the INPS for their full-time employees. As there are monetary sanctions for 
firms declaring less than those daily minima while no check is performed on declared work-
ing days (Di), it is easy to understand why firms declare a number of working days lower 
that the effective ones. Firms prefer to leave effective monthly wages (Twi) unchanged even 
if lower than monthly minima while they under-declare the number of working days (Di).
The result will be the consistency between declared daily wages (Twi / Di) and minimum 
current daily wages (Cnldwi).
Where the evasion phenomenon is mainly widespread, as in the Mezzogiorno, the pay 
resulting from the INPS database is artificially over-estimated. We look below at what hap-
pens in the event of this kind of evasion: as the number of days declared is far lower than 26 
(Di < effective monthly working days  26) (if not justified for example by redundancy 
payment periods, i.e. CIG), the Normalized unit monthly pay, Numwi = [(Twi/Di) * 26], is 
over-estimated with respect to the declared one [Twi].  
To tell the truth, both Ntmwi and Numwi would be higher than their effective counter-
parts even if declared and effective monthly working days, equal to each other, were both 
lower than 26 (Di = effective monthly working days < 26). The “factor 26” is a figure really 
higher than that characterising the effective working days in many sectors; it only serves to 
facilitate INPS administrative checks of the monthly mandatory contribution that employers 
have to pay for their full time workers which is calculated with respect to minimum daily
wages and has nothing to do with respect for whatever reasonable estimate of pay.  
Moreover, total Normalized wages paid in a month (Ntmwi) are only potentially paid to 
workers that is: (1) if they worked for 26 days; (2) at the firms’ declared pay (Twi); (3) con-
sistent with minimum daily wages of l.389/89. These three conditions are generally unful-
filled in under-developed situations. 
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evasion performed by firms. This evasion was achieved through an under-
declaration of working days performed by firms in order to obtain a daily
pay consistent with the minimum daily wages, decided by law and collec-
tive bargaining (as mandatory according to Law 389/89), even in the pres-
ence of a declared (and effective) monthly pay lower than monthly minima. 
This under-declaration produced an artificial over-estimation of normalised 
wages resulting from the INPS database; given the monthly wage declared 
the lower the number of declared working days, the higher is the normal-
ised unit monthly wage resulting in the INPS archive. In this way there 
arises an evident conflict between employer and employee as a lower 
amount of contribution is paid than what would be required by Law, given 
the effective working days.  
Tab. 1 – Manufacturing firms per-employee labour cost (Centre-North = 100) 
Firm size 
(no. employees)  2001  2002 2003 
11-20 85.4 85.1 86.6 
21-50 88.6 91.2 92.6 
51-250 98.6 107.0 112.1 
251-500 105.0 106.5 110.3 
Over 500 69.0 72.8 79.9 
Totale 89.3 92.5 96.3 
In the Mezzogiorno the high level of normalized unit wages resulting in 
the INPS archive is both the effect of firms being far from their full capac-
ity (downsizing) and of the kind of national insurance contributions evasion 
described: both phenomena keep effective monthly working days a long 
way from 26. The evasion phenomenon, however, also occur in the North-
Eastern provinces of Italy, albeit to a lesser extent6.
The difference between effective and normalized wages would be negli-
gible only if the number of monthly working days “declared” by firms were 
equal to “effective” ones and, however, both no lower than 26. Had nor-
malization been performed considering “factor 22” (i.e. Saturday and Sun-
day excluded) there would have been a lower distortion. 
As far as area wage differentials are concerned the bias would be negli-
gible only if the differences were uniformly distributed all over the country. 
6 From the common benchmark of 26, the distance between monthly working days de-
clared in the southern provinces is farther than that in the northern ones (see Ginzburg at al., 
1998, for detailed provincial figures).
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As this is almost impossible, the normalization gives rise to purely virtual 
area differentials7.
It the light of above the INPS Archive can be considered, as Ginzburg et
al. (1998, 1999) sustain, mainly one of virtual rather than effective wages. 
This is true even for the INPS on-line Archive called Aquarius which re-
calculated the 1990-1993 data using the normalization procedure started in 
1994. It is worth recalling, at this point, that Lucifora and Origo (1997, 
1999) failed to find the wage curve either in the 1990-94 INPS Aquarius or 
in 1990-95 INPS companies archive. 
Effective area wage differentials rather than the virtual (ad hoc) wage 
differentials measured by INPS must be in the analyses and on the policy 
agenda. Unfortunately, virtually absent area wages differentials underlay 
the re-proposed “wage cages” (“gabbie salariali”) seen as a remedy for 
solving persistently high unemployment in the south of Italy (Faini, 1995). 
In 1992 the automatic cost of living allowances, the wage indexation 
mechanism called the “scala mobile” had already been abolished. Under the 
Protocol of July 1993, signed by the Italian government and social parties, 
decentralised bargaining and a short-term wage freeze were instituted in the 
spirit of social cooperation and to avoid wage-price spirals8.
As the specific incentive and profit sharing schemes were left to each 
firm, this reform introduced efficiency wages considerations in the whole 
economy9 and, potentially, pro-cyclical real wages.  
Obviously the amount of rent to be shared depends on the economic per-
formance of firms on the other inputs and output markets and on the fiscal 
7 The distortions produced by the normalization procedure are not only of territorial 
kind. As far as temporary work is concerned further distortion is drawn from the multiplica-
tion of daily pay for the maximum number of hours relative to full-time workers (i.e. 26). In 
sectors, like fashion, where seasonal change matters, artificially high wages will appear. 
This is, for example, the case of craft activities that can interrupt production and suspend 
workers for a number of days that are not paid at all but may appear as fully paid. This does 
not happen in industrial firms as they solve the seasonal factor with overtime.
8 Under the Protocol of July 1993 a two-step hierarchical procedure was established by 
which wages were first collectively negotiated by each sector union at the national level; 
then, an agreement at firm level determined a wage premium linked to firm profits to intro-
duce rent-sharing. The national collective agreement can be renegotiated every two years 
with the aim of keeping wage purchasing power according to a programmed inflation rate. 
Second level bargaining can be renegotiated every four years with the aim of rent sharing 
between employers and employees. The aim of the Protocol was to favour efficiency and to 
introduce important changes in wage determination and in industrial relations without com-
promising wage purchasing power and, so, effective domestic aggregate demand. 
9 The existence of “inside” factors as regressors in the wage curve in Italian manufactur-
ing of 1989-1991, 1992-1994 demonstrates that efficiency wage considerations at firm level 
were operating (above the minimum collective wages) even before 1993. 
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wedge. Thus the “battle of mark-ups” (Layard, Nickell, 1991) between em-
ployers and employees (unions) fixed the shares at firm level. Wage mod-
eration in the 1990s consisted in a considerable fall in labour’s income 
share. From 1993 to 2001 the wage labour share, already declining since 
the previous decade, stayed on a downward trend while the opposite oc-
curred for the gross profit share in net product. The purchasing power of 
wages was reduced by inflation even for full-time employees. According to 
OECD estimates, between 1996 and 2002 Italy had the worst real wage per-
formance in the EU. 
At the same time, the distance between labour productivity and labour 
costs was growing. This was essentially due to a number of legislative 
measures to narrow the tax wedge on wages such as the replacement, in 
1998, of the mandatory contribution to the National Health Service with the 
IRAP, a regional tax on value added for production activities. This trans-
formed a social contribution into a reduction in tax burden on business 
(section 7). 
The Budget for 2001 introduced a monthly, per worker, tax credit for 
firms hiring workers with permanent contracts which lasted from the moment 
of hiring to the end of December 2003 (Cipollone, Guelfi, 2003, 2006). This 
tax credit was differentiated with respect to the geographical area (it was 
higher in the South) and business sector. Cipollone et al. (2004) calculated 
that the introduction of the tax credit may have raised labour force participa-
tion by 1-2% in 2001 and 2002, mainly among males aged 35-54 with a low 
schooling level who probably left the underground economy.  
Even if, from 1993 to 2001, the wedge between output prices and unit 
labour costs was constantly increasing, firms did not seek to win interna-
tional competition by developing of new products and quality. The effect of 
the unequal distribution of income reduced consumption and investment 
and hence effective aggregate demand.  
Another aspect of the labour market reform was the de-regulation of 
dismissals. In 1991, Law 223 introduced a procedure for collective dis-
missals in firms with more than 15 employees that reduced firing costs for 
larger firms (Bertola, Ichino, 1995, pp. 387-8). The job losses, due to dis-
missals and early retirements, from 1991 to 1995 were so high as to register 
the most severe recession since the Second World War (Brandolini et al.,
2007). This phenomenon caused changes in the composition of the labour 
force with the complicity of Law 196 of 1997 and of Law 30/2003. The so-
called Treu Package (Pacchetto Treu) established by Law 196/1997 ex-
tended work experience, part-time and temporary work, employment 
schemes, increased age limits of “apprentices”, and introduced “rental 
work” (“lavoro interinale”).
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Under Law 30/2003 de-regulation of the labour market was almost 
completed except for the improvement of the welfare system that could 
have added security (of income, of life-training,…) to flexibility as the new 
ad hoc coined clichés – “flexicurity” – suggested10.
10 At http://eurofound.europa.eu we can read: The European Commission in its Em-
ployment in Europe 2006 report describes flexicurity as an optimal balance between labour 
market flexibility and security for employees against labour market risks. The Commission’s 
interpretation of flexicurity involves replacing the notion of job security, a principle that 
dominated employment relations until recently, with that of “protection of people”. The 
flexicurity model, first implemented in Denmark by the social democratic Prime Minister 
Poul Nyrup Rasmussen in the 1990s, is a combination of easy hiring and firing (flexibility 
for employers) and high benefits for the unemployed (security for the employees). Perceived 
as a new way of viewing flexibility, flexicurity represents a means whereby employees and 
companies can better adapt to insecurities associated with global markets. The Commis-
sion’s 1997 Green Paper on “Partnership for a new organisation of work’ stressed the impor-
tance of both flexibility and security for competitiveness and the modernisation of work or-
ganisation. The idea also features prominently in the adaptability pillar’ of the EU employ-
ment guidelines where the social partners are invited ‘to negotiate at all appropriate levels 
agreements to modernise the organisation of work, including flexible working arrangements, 
with the aim of making undertakings productive and competitive and achieving the required 
balance between flexibility and security”. This “balance” is also consistently referred to in 
the Commission’s Social Policy Agenda 2000-2005. An integral part of the re-launch of the 
Lisbon Strategy in 2005 was the emphasis on training, which continues to remain a central 
aspect of flexicurity. The need for security of employment to balance flexibility in the la-
bour market is also reflected in the European social dialogue. For example, the Framework 
Agreement on par-time work (concluded 6 June 1997) and the Framework Agreement on 
fixed-term work (concluded 18 March 1999) both refer to “flexibility in/of working time 
and security for workers”. Employment security is a particular concern in relation to fixed-
term work. In the Commission’s Explanatory Memorandum to the proposed draft directive 
implementing the Agreement, the Commission emphasises that “…the social partners” con-
tribution is positive in itself in that it guarantees that consideration is given both to business 
competitiveness and to the interests of workers’. Although in recent years there have been 
different interpretations of the flexicurity term, with the ETUC in particular rejecting the 
claim that job security needs to be replaced by employment security, recent developments 
suggest that the social partners along with the Commission are moving towards an interpre-
tation which is acceptable to all parties. The key breakthrough occurred towards the end of 
2007, when the European Parliament endorsed a resolution entitled the Common Principles 
of Flexicurity on 29 November. The Parliament’s position is a response to the Commission 
Communication Towards common Principles of Flexicurity. In December 2007, the Council 
adopted eight common principles of flexicurity as follows. 
x Flexicurity is designed to implement the main principles of the Lisbon Strategy. 
x Flexicurity, in addition to being committed to life-long learning, active labour market 
policies and a modern social welfare system, sees the need for flexible contractual ar-
rangements.
x Flexicurity needs to adapt to the different circumstances in each Member State. 
x Flexicurity needs to support open and inclusive labour markets which help to reintro-
duce inactive employees back into employment. 
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If, in February 2008, the European Commission launched a “Mission for 
Flexicurity” (see footnote n.11) there is more than one sign that civil rights 
of people involved by de-regulation of labour market in Europe are se-
verely compromised. The labour market is deeply segmented. The idea that 
de-regulation is not so bad as it affects only a small part of the labour force 
is not at all convincing. In Italy the reform produced a duality in the labour 
market as it interested especially affected the new entrants. Older, more ex-
perienced workers with stable contracts on the one hand; younger, less ex-
perienced workers with temporary, atypical contracts or “rented”, that will 
probably remain so due to their probable everlasting temporariness. Free-
lance workers, quasi-employees (co.co.co. workers) are distinguishable for 
not benefiting from employment protection legislation, having lower social 
security contribution and being paid less and without any “rent-sharing” 
perspectives.
Excessive turnover does not allow human capital accumulation. Contini 
and Pacelli (2005) assert that, as far as WHIP is concerned, job and worker-
turnover in the Mezzogiorno are far higher than in the rest of the country 
but with fewer direct shifts from less productive to higher productive jobs, 
being more associated to firm turnover.  
Temporary contracts are a device to bypass the regulation of individual 
dismissals and represent an indirect but effective deterrent to shirking. 
Unlike work – and – training contracts (which spread in 1994 and are char-
acterised by a fixed term and reduced social contributions for young work-
ers) temporary contracts make it impossible for the worker to acquire skills. 
In dangerous work they risk dying before receiving any training (see sec-
tion 6b); in safe work the probability of renewal is very scarce. If this were 
x Flexicurity needs to involve the smooth transition between jobs by constantly up-
grading employees’ skills and providing the necessary social protection in transition pe-
riods.
x Flexicurity should promote both gender equality as well as considering means to recon-
cile work–life balance issues. 
x Flexicurity needs the support of the social partners. 
x Flexicurity needs to involve a cost-effective distribution of resources which public 
budgets can sustain. 
In February 2008, the Commission underlined its commitment to flexicurity by announc-
ing the setting up of the “Mission for Flexicurity”. Consisting of members representing the 
Commission, ETUC, Business Europe and the French government (French presidency of the 
Council from July 2008), the Mission’s role is to visit four or five Member States, and dis-
cuss in depth the state of play as regards the development and implementation of the nation-
al pathways based on the Common Flexicurity Principles. In December 2008, the Commis-
sion will present the Mission report to the employment ministers, outlining ways in which 
the principles can be best implemented, taking into account the specific circumstances of 
each Member State.
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not so, the employer would have invested more in the job relationship than 
is possible with this kind of contract.  
Neither efficiency wage nor bargaining and insider-outsider theories are 
reasonably applicable to the relation between employers, “quasi-emplo-
yees” and/or “quasi-unemployed”. Last but not least, different implications 
of the reforms are to be considered as regards the North-South and the gen-
der gap. Temporary contracts are too often a device to bypass the regulation 
of maternity and child-care. 
3. The Wage Curve: A Theoretical Insight 
Before Blanchflower and Oswald’s “The Wage Curve” of 1994 (hence-
forth B/O W-C), labour economists regressed wages on individual or firm 
characteristics to estimate wage gaps and measure the value of education, 
skills, firm level of investments in R & D, and so on. What is new in the 
B/O W-C is the adding of individual local labour characteristics as regres-
sors in microeconometric wage functions, where “local” stands for a place 
and/or an industry. 
B/O found an empirical regularity in that, for different kinds of workers, 
in different economies, at different times, a 1% increase in the rate of local 
unemployment produces a 10% decrease in contemporaneous wages locally 
paid to the employees. 
In other words, the W-C suggests the existence of a stable relationship 
between local unemployment and the wage level with a downward-sloping 
convex curve in the wage/unemployment plane. That is, the wages of 
workers in labour markets with high unemployment are lower than wages 
of similar workers in markets with lower unemployment.  
As observed by Card (1995), from the first reading of B/O’s “The 
Wage Curve” the reader starts to compare earlier studies of interregional 
migration and labour market equilibrium (Harris, Todaro, 1970; Hall, 
1970; Roback, 1982), more recent studies of the cyclical variability of 
real wages (Bils, 1985; Solon, Barsky, Parker, 1994) and studies of the 
short-run responses of wages and unemployment to local labour market 
shocks (Bartik, 1991; Blanchard, Katz, 1992). The possibility of local un-
employment affecting wage rates was first considered by earlier studies of 
interregional migration and labour market equilibrium by Harris and To-
daro (1970) and Hall (1970). These works were both based on the com-
pensating wage differentials theory by Adam Smith so well summarized 
by the assertion: 
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The whole of the advantages and disadvantages of the different em-
ployments of labour and stock must, in the same neighbourhood, be either 
perfectly equal or continually tending to equality. If in the same neighbour-
hood, there was any employment evidently either more or less advanta-
geous than the rest, so many people would crowd into it in the one case, 
and so many would desert it in the other, that its advantages would soon 
return to the level of the other employments (Smith, 1976)  
Therefore, as far as the compensating differential theory is concerned, 
there is a positive (and not a negative) relation between wages and unem-
ployment. No room is therefore left for a wage curve in this theory. 
Keynes (1936) explained pro-cyclical real wages in terms of monopoly 
and pro-cyclical elasticity of demand while he never departed from the first 
postulate of classical theory. From a theoretical point of view, pro-cyclical 
real wages are compatible both with disequilibrium models presented by 
Patinkin (1965), Clower (1965), Leijonhfvud (1967), Barro and Grossman 
(1971), Malinvaud (1977), Muellbauer and Portes (1978) and with imper-
fectly competitive models (Solow, 1986; Layard, Nickell, 1991; Carlin, 
Soskice, 1990; Blanchflower, Oswald, 1994).  
As well described by Patinkin (1965), defining himself more Keynesian 
than Keynes, lowering real wages is neither necessary nor sufficient to re-
store full employment. Involuntary unemployment is not the result of real 
wage rigidity but of the insufficient effective demand in the output market 
that constrains production and labour demand.  
In the neo-Keynesian approach the non-Walrasian equilibrium is due to 
market imperfections. Without market imperfections, neoclassical full equi-
librium is reached. Wages are not set to clear the market.  
Firms act as local monopsonists, or being engaged in monopsonistic 
competition in the case of costless entry.  
Unemployment is involuntary. And, as already deduced from Marx’s 
Capital, the existence of an army of unemployed serves as a discipline de-
vice for the employed (Rowthorn, 1977). Rowthorn (1977: 237) himself 
considered the level of demand a device that is able to control what Layard 
and Nickell (1986) called “the battle of mark-ups”.
Following Solow (1986), 
“Someone defined an economist as a parrot trained to repeat ‘Supply and 
demand, supply and demand’. There are many worse things you could teach a 
parrot to say – and we ear them every day – but I want to suggest that, in the 
case of the labor market, our preoccupation with price-mediated market 
clearing as the ‘natural’ equilibrium condition may be a serious error”. 
66 
Moreover following B/O, 
“one of the underlying ideas in this book, is that the competitive model 
of the labor market is probably an inadequate framework for the study of 
pay and unemployment” (p. 20).  
And following Card (1995), 
“the compensating differential theory pertains to the expected unem-
ployment rate in local market, while the wage curve relation … concerns 
contemporaneous unemployment”.  
B/O presented three alternative models as theoretical interpretations of 
W-C: a model of regionally based implicit contracts; an efficiency wage 
model; a bargaining model. Thus the Wage Curve is interpreted as one of 
the building blocks of imperfect labour markets, as a quasi-labour supply 
function looking at one side of the market. In a bargaining or union model 
the ability of insiders (unions) to claim larger shares of the surplus to be di-
vided is kept low by a high number of outsiders leaving on the surrounding 
and potentially applying for a job. In the efficiency wage model wages paid 
influence productivity; the propensity to shirk and to provide work effort is 
controlled by the level of local unemployment because if this is high em-
ployees are more frightened to loose their jobs and put in higher effort even 
at low wage levels. In other words, in both the bargaining and efficiency 
wage models there is a negative relation between wages and unemploy-
ment. 
As observed by Card (1995) in the contractual model, spatially isolated 
employers offer a standard Azariadis-Baily-Gordon wage/employment con-
tract to potential employees. Differences in amenity values of places gener-
ate differences in wages and expected local unemployment rates, while the 
level of unemployment benefit is constant across areas (this is a critical as-
sumption). For each realization of the demand shock, in order to offset in-
come risk, the optimal contract will lead to a higher level of contractual 
employment and wages in the low-amenity regions. Thus there will be 
lower unemployment and higher wages in the low-amenity regions. 
Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991) sought to reconcile the two points 
of view: the wage curve may exist in the short run as a signal of bargaining 
or of efficiency wages (partial-equilibrium models), but, in the long run, 
migration will lead to convergence of per capita remunerations and hence 
to a decay of the wage curve (equilibrium model). Unemployment rates dif-
fer widely between regions, occupations and age, race and sex groups, and 
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such differences are very often highly persistent. L-N-J distinguish the rea-
sons why occupation and geographical mobility does not eliminate the dif-
ferences between unemployment rates into persistent and temporary imbal-
ances between supply and demand for labour across skill groups, regions 
and age groups. They call both imbalances as “mismatches”. 
To define the structure of unemployment, when the labour force is ex-
ogenous, the short run has to be considered separately from the long run, 
when migration is possible between skill groups and regions (but not be-
tween sexes and races). L-N-J assert that cross-section studies may fail to 
hightlight the existence of a wage curve as they capture a mix of the wage 
equation and the long run equilibrium migration condition which slopes the 
other way in, ceteris paribus, migration competitive equilibrium. The solu-
tion is the estimation of repeated cross-sections and of panel data without 
forgetting time-dummies. 
Farther from a reconciliation are B/O. They attribute the stability over 
time of the wage curve to regional amenities that may compensate for poor 
coupling of wages and regional unemployment such that regions may lie 
along the same wage curve. Interregional migration does not always suc-
ceed in eliminating pay and employment differences across the regions 
among workers with the same skills. Migration is not an instantaneous re-
action to small differences in economic variables. It is a costly and slow 
process. Migration will take place only gradually in response to regional 
inequalities. When differences in wages or unemployment persist they may 
reflect local amenities (sunshine; certainty of property rights; diffuse legal-
ity) or disamenities (e.g.: extremely widespread crime; pollution; extreme 
temperatures; high rainfall; lack of sunshine). 
As a matter of fact whether a local characteristic is an amenity or a 
disamenity is really questionable and subjective (e.g. wind-speed is an es-
sential input for generation and accumulation of wind-energy and for wind-
surfers, sailors and their coachers while it may be a disamenity for their 
own little babies).
There may be more agreement on more extreme local characteristics 
(e.g. who wants to live for ever at Poles!). 
However, the statistical stability of the relation across countries and 
over time made B/O argue that it is an equilibrium locus of wages and un-
employment rates that replaces the market level labour supply function. 
Moreover the 200 estimates for 30 countries recently showed by Nijkamp 
and Poot (2005) “fly in the face of the expected equilibration of earnings as 
predicted in the Harris-Todaro and compensating differential models” 
(Persky, Felsenstein, 2008, p. 9). 
Phelps (1992: 1004) described the equilibrium wage curve as a surro-
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gate employment supply curve that, as Woodford (1992: 396) observed, 
lies to the left and is flatter than the true Marshallian labour supply curve. 
In this case the wage curve is part of “structural” unemployed models 
(Layard, Nickell, 1986; Layard, Nickell, Jackman 1991; Lindbeck, 1993; 
Phelps, 1992, 1994; Woodford, 1992, 1994).  
Non-equilibrium, agent-based, models of workers and firms with on-
the-job searching, endogenous entrepreneurial decision and endogenous 
wage and income determination as that of Richiardi (2005) are able to re-
produce Wage, Beveridge and Okun curves and other stylized facts, gener-
ally accepted in labour economics, as emerging only out of equilibrium, 
during the adjustment processes towards the stationary state. And, thus, 
from a theoretical point of view, taking these facts as “building blocks” of 
equilibrium models might be misleading. If wages are mainly driven by 
productivity no wage curve will appear. In a joint investigation of empirical 
regularities Richiardi (2005) suggested that the shape of the wage curve is 
not independent of the shape of the Beveridge and Okun curves which are 
thus related to the matching function. 
“The somehow fuzzy evidence on the existence and the slope of these 
curves may be due to the fact that the data considered by many empirical 
studies belong to different regimes, more or less distant from a stationary 
state” (Richiardi, 2005, p. 24). 
The job vacancy chains models (Persky, Felsenstein, 2008) reinterpret 
Marshallian surpluses as the change in the area under B/O W-C type. Via 
wage curves, changes in regional unemployment rates are used to estimate 
changes in local wages to calculate changes in rents going to workers. 
These welfare gains are consistent with worker gains achieved through mo-
bility up regional job chains opened by new growth in labour demand.  
In theory, new regional jobs (local employment growth) yield two dis-
tinct sources of welfare gains to workers: 1) mobility gains for workers tak-
ing up newly created jobs and for those filling the vacancies left by the first 
kind of workers (vacancy chains); 2) the Marshallian producer surpluses for 
workers remaining in old jobs experiencing real wages increases as the la-
bour market tightens (increasing demand).  
Which of the two effects will prevail depends on the elasticity of local 
wages curve; if this is high mobility gains prevail.  
The demand-driven vacancy chain model assumes involuntary unem-
ployment and underemployment and studies the effect of increasing de-
mand for labour on local unemployment. The effect on the unemployment 
rate will depend on whether the increase in demand is mainly for before 
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“unemployed”, “out-of-labour force” or “in-migrants”. If wage curves (one 
for each labour market segment) take the place of neoclassical supply 
curves of labour, any reduction in unemployment rates can be translated 
into increases in wage rates. In a multi-sector wage curve model, these 
wage increases constitute Marshallian-like surpluses or rents. 
4. Empirical Results: Before and after the 1993 Income Policy Agree-
ment 
In the case of Italy the wide range of evidence obtained form research 
alternates “deaths” and “resurrections” of the W-C. Structural breaks in 
time series are only part of the explanation of the variety of the results. The 
greatest evidence is the effect of the databases used for the analyses. The 
databases mostly used were: Eurisko Social Survey, Bank of Italy’s Survey 
of Italian Household Budgets, INPS Archives; ISTAT Regional Accounts, 
Capitalia’s database (former Mediocredito’s database), Revelli’s Worker 
History Panel. 
Following Card (1995), the wage curve to be estimated can be written 
as11:
log w i r t = a + b log U r t + c X i r t + d Z r t + f r + g t + e i r t     (1),
where w i r t is the real wage rate for individual i (i = 1, …, N) observed in 
the regional labour market r (r = 1, …, R) in period t (t = 1, …, T). U r t is 
the unemployment rate in labour market r in period t12; X i r t and Z i r are two 
11 The log-log form of (1) is a log linear proxy of the first order condition of an optimi-
zation problem of wage determination either in the bargaining approach (e.g. Layard et al.,
1991) or in the efficiency wage approach (e.g. Salop, 1979; Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984; 
Phelps, 1994; Campbell, Orszag, 1998).
12 As observed by Card (1995) the obvious absence of “i” in the unemployment variable 
term of the equation (1) has important implications. The actual number of observations in the 
case of a group means regression is RT and not NT; the error components e i r t in equation (1) 
will be correlated across people from the same regional labour market because individuals in 
the same labour market may share some common components of variance that are not entirely 
attributable either to their specific measured characteristics or to the local unemployment rate. 
In this case, the estimated standard error of the unemployment effect obtained from the “NT” 
regression will be significantly downward biased (Moulton 1986, 1990). Following Blanch-
flower and Oswald (1994) a simple way to overcome Moluton’s problem is to average over 
individuals in region r and period t to estimate: log w r t = a + b log U r t + c Y r t + f r + g t + e r t,
where w r t is the average log real wage for all individuals in region r at time period t, Y r t is the 
whole set of measured characteristics for all individuals in region r at time period t and the un-
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sets of measured characteristics of individual i such as age, education, mari-
tal status, employment work status (X i r t) and gender (Z i r); f r is the region 
effect, g t the time period effect and e i r t the error term.  
As regards the international literature, the wage curve empirical relation 
is found by Blanchflower and Oswald (1994) for most of the OECD coun-
tries, for the USA by Card (1995) and Bratsberg and Turunen (1996); for 
Germany by Wagner (1994), and by Baltagi and Blien (1998); for East 
Germany by Baltagi, Blien and Wolf (1999); for Janssens and Konings 
(1998) for Belgium; Nijkamp P. and Poot J. (2005) for thirty contries.  
As regards the Italian labour market, Blanchflower and Oswald (1994) 
found that employment elasticity of pay was –0.12 in 1980s.  
Research estimating the wage curve frequently refuted the existence of 
such a relationship in the 1990s (Manacorda, Petrongolo, 1999; Lucifora, 
Origo, 1999). According to this research, the level of wages does not reflect 
the very high level of unemployment and this is one of the major obstacles 
to economic development. The prevailing national level of wage bargaining 
and scarce diffusion of negotiation at industry and firm level have generally 
been indicated as the main reasons for the scarce dispersion of wages among 
Italian regions. By contrast, other empirical works have indicated Italy as a 
leader for wage and labour flexibility among the OECD countries though, 
unfortunately, also a leader for negative employment dynamic. Moreover, 
sector and firm levels of bargaining are already commonly found in private 
industry and, above all, in manufacturing (Costabile, Papagni, 1998). 
Netti (1999, 2001, 2006) found the wage curve in the Italian manufactur-
ing industry using the Capitalia’s database over the periods 1989-91, 1992-
94, 1995-97, 1998-00 and the Bank of Italy’s Historical Database of the 
Survey of Italian Household Budget over the period 1993-2000.  
Since 1989 there had been a statistically significant elasticity of wages 
(labour costs per employee) to unemployment (even higher than 10% in 
some sectors). In particular, according to the sector of analysis, the elasticity 
of wages to unemployment was 9-15% in 1989-94; 7%-13% in 1995-97; 
10% in 1998-0013.
At the same time, only with the Capitalia’s database, we were able to de-
observed determinants of wages across markets, e r t, are considered to be not correlated across 
observations. Unfortunately this is a very imprecise way to estimate the coefficients for the 
individual control variables whose presence is rare and is one of the most appreciable charac-
teristics of a database. Following Greene (1997, pp. 289-292) “the best use of the group means 
will never be better than using original data, and may be worse”, and then “the greater the 
variation within the groups that is discarded by replacing individual elements with group 
means, the greater will be the information loss”.
13 For more details see Netti, 1999, 2001, 2006.
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tect whether wages reflected firm performances by measuring their elastic-
ity to value-added per employee. The value-added elasticity was 20-40% in 
1989-94, 37-73% in 1995-97.  
The increasing trend showed by the figures of unemployment and value-
added per-employee elasticity stands for an increasing effect of firms per-
formance (“inside” factor) while a contemporary decreasing effect of local 
unemployment (“outside” factor) on wages.  
As observed by Layard, Nickell, Jackman (1991, pp. 181-192), the sig-
nificant effect of firm-specific factors on wages (inside factors), like value-
added, profitability, distance from full-capacity, is a clear sign that non-
compensating wage differentials are at work as wages are not set to clear the 
market. The increasing importance of “inside” factors is a sign that the re-
forms of the Italian labour market have failed to increase labour market 
competition for, of course, in a competitive labour market firm-specific fac-
tors have no role to play. Moreover, it is worth noting that the coefficient on 
unemployment is decreasing in that of firm-specific value added.  
However, as it was observed by Netti (1999b) and Svimez (2007) re-
gional disamenities (outside factors) in the south of Italy (high crime rate, 
uncertainty in property rights, poor infrastructures, credit rationing, …) are 
still dramatically important in explaining firm performances and hence oc-
cupation and pay levels.  
Using the WHIP database, Devicienti et al. (2006) found an unemploy-
ment elasticity of the top-up component of wages of -0,076 which lowered 
to -0,029 in case total wages were taken as dependent variables. This low 
value, persisting in WHIP’s data even after 1993, is justified by the Authors 
by considering that tot-up components only represent 22% of total wages.  
It is worth remembering that WHIP’s data are derived from 
INPS’archives. It is not clear, either from Devicienti et al. (2006), Leom-
bruni (2005) or from http://www.laboratoriorevelli.it/whip if normalization 
bias, discussed previously (par. 1), is solved and, in that case, what kind of 
solution is proposed to overcome Ginzburg et al. (1998, 1999) severe but 
really shareable conclusions. 
According to Devicienti et al. (2006), top-up components of wages were 
reconstructed as employees’ total wage in excess to the base, minimum, 
wage stipulated by his (her) specific occupation national contract including 
any automatic price indexation. Employees whose wage was below their 
base level were excluded. This exclusion points out that the original 
WHIP’s data contained wages below their own base level.
Moreover, as Devicienti et al. (2006) asserted that the available variable 
is the workers’ average weekly wage, this may be a signal that WHIP’s data 
are still affected by contribution evasion bias. It is worth remembering, in 
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fact, that INPS’ monthly mandatory contributions refer to minimum con-
tractual daily wages and that the number of days paid declared in a month 
is too often lower than the effective ones and, however, than 26. 
Another clue of the persistence of bias is the decision of Devicienti et al.
(2006) to restrict the WHIP’s sample to full-time employees. But, it is 
worth noting that, the Authors considered a large definition of full-time 
employees: those with at least three months in continuous employments.  
Moreover, referring to the 10% of individuals having negative top-up 
components, the Authors claimed undetectable reporting and coding errors! 
With all this in mind let’s come to the results of their analysis. The Au-
thors found a break in their estimates of the “top-up wage curve” just after 
1993 and attributed their result to a “resurrection” of a wage curve inexist-
ent in the eighties and in the early nineties and that has re-emerged after 
the 1993 Income Policy Agreement. 
No reference is made by the Authors either to previous works, demon-
strating the impossibility to use virtual wages (i.e. Ginzburg et al., 1998, 
1999) in serious analyses, or to those demonstrating the existence of the 
wage curve since the end of eighties (Netti, 1999a). 
The power of the “publication” bias is really astonishing! 
5. Empirical Results: after the De-regulation of the Labour Market 
“Inside” and “outside” factors explaining wages are considered for the 
period 2001-2003 by means of Capitalia’s database and for the period 
2002-2006 by means of Bank of Italy’s Historical database of the Survey of 
Italian Household Budgets. 
Equation (1) is estimated; regressions and tests performed are shown in 
the appendices14.
5a) Manufacturing budget data15
As far as Capitalia’s database is concerned, the per-employee value 
added becomes a very significant “firm” factor in explaining wage per-
formance in manufacturing. The per-employee value added elasticity of 
14 The regression models used are in depth analysed in Greene (1990, 1991). For an in 
depth analysis of the results please contact the Author at the e-mail address: netti@unina.it. 
15 Accurate description of the database is in Capitalia (2005).
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wages is about 88% in a Least Squares Dummy Variable Regression 
(LSDV) characterised by an adjusted R-squared of 82%.  
The stratification variables evidenced, as regards: 
1. “time”, a slightly decreasing trend of wages (2001 is the benchmark);  
2. “sectors”, a positive effect of scale and specialised suppliers Pavitt’s 
sectors (hi-tech sector is the benchmark);  
3. “dimension”, no significant effect (more than 500 employees is the 
benchmark); 
4. “regions”, a negative significant effect for Abruzzo, Piemonte, 
Lombardia (Valle d’Aosta is the benchmark); 
The other regressors evidenced, as regards: 
1. typical contracts, no effect of the number of definite part-time (v. full-
time) workers, indefinite part-time workers, training contract workers; 
2. atypical contracts, a positive effect of occasional workers while a nega-
tive effect of hired workers (interinali); 
3. education level, no effect (no education level is the benchmark); 
4. qualification level, a positive effect of blue unskilled collars and white 
collars.
5b) Individual data16
The “outside” effect of unemployment on wages is still evident in the 
Bank of Italy’s database (SHIW). The unemployed elasticity of pay is of 
about 4-5% that is 2-3% lower that in the previous periods (Netti, 2006).  
The highest individual wage differentials are relative to qualifications 
and gender. Men’s wages are more than 40% higher than those of women’s 
one. Managers and entrepreneurs earn much more than the others.  
A look within the sectors reveals something else.  
1. As far as the industrial sector is concerned the “outside” effect of regional 
unemployment which is of about 5% in the OLS model and 4% in the 
REM model is concealed by the regional stratification index (Ireg) in the 
LSDV model. The LSDV model is preferred to the OLS and REM mod-
els by the LM and Hausmann tests respectively. Male gender, high skill 
and high level of education positively influence the level of wages paid. 
2. As regards the public sector, the regional stratification index (Ireg) in 
the LSDV model inverts the sign of unemployment elasticity of wages 
in the OLS (26%) and REM (12%) models. Male gender, high skill and 
high level of education positively influence the level of wages paid. 
16 Accurate description of the Bank of Italy’s database may be found in http:/www. 
bancaditalia.it
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3. With regard to construction LSDV with Ireg is rejected by the LM and 
Hausmann tests versus both OLS and REM models according to which 
there is an unemployment elasticity of wages of about 35-37%. Male 
gender positively influences the level of wages paid. 
4. For the financial sector, an unemployment elasticity of wages of 51% in 
OLS is concealed by Ireg in the LSDV and REM models which are sta-
tistically preferred. Male gender and medium level of education posi-
tively influence the level of wages paid. 
5. In terms of the transport sector preferred REM model stands for a 25% un-
employment elasticity of wages which was 39 % in the OLS. The LSDV 
model with Ireg stratification index is rejected by the Hausmann test. 
We can conclude as follows:
x regional amenities (or disamenities) have become more significant than 
local unemployment in explaining wages differentials in different sec-
tors (the regional stratification index is rejected only in the case of con-
struction and transport);
x high levels of education and skill positively influence wages only in the 
public sector; a medium level is enough for the financial sector;
x male gender explains wage differentials in almost all the sectors; 
x the local unemployment elasticity of wages is still predominant with re-
spect to other regional characteristics in transport and construction.
6. Labour Forces and Regional Rates of Unemployment in the ISTAT’s 
New Data Collection (RCFL) 
To understand fully what is happening after the near-complete de-
regulation of the labour market it is necessary to introduce some new defi-
nitions.
The harmonized standards introduced by the EU Council’s Regulation 
n. 577/98 (see Official Journal of the European Community of 14.3.1998) 
produced a substitution of a self-perception subjective criterion with an ob-
jective yardstick to measure the state of the employed17.
The objective yardstick defines as employed those who, in the working 
population (more than 15 years old), have worked at least one hour a week 
before the interview, albeit, for free in his (her) family firm, or paid in kind 
or with a provision of services wherever else. If absent from work in that 
week (i.e. less than an hour of weekly work), the interviewees are objec-
17 The subjective criterion is, however, kept in the questionnaire to understand the dis-
crepancies between the two criteria.
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tively employed if they return to work within three months or even later if 
paid at least the 50% of their former wage or if they keep their occupation 
in the case of self-employment.  
On the basis of these new standards the ISTAT reconstructed the time se-
ries (IV quarter of 1992 – IV quarter of 2004) of the main indicators of la-
bour market. What follows was observed with respect to the original series: 
1. higher employment (level and rate); + 177,000 of which + 9,000 in the 
North,
2. -141,000 in the Centre, + 309,000 in the Italian “Mezzogiorno” and, as 
regards gender,
3. + 287,000 females and – 109,000 males. 
4. lower unemployment (level and rate); – 93,000 of whom, + 55,000 in 
the North,  
5. 21,000 in the Centre, – 127,000 in the “Mezzogiorno” and, as regards 
gender,
6. -58,000 thousands for males and – 35,000 thousands for females.  
 In terms of the unemployment rate, -0.4 % of which + 0.3 % for males 
and -0.8% for females. 
The following table reports the 2007 regional unemployment rate in the 
new ISTAT data collection. 
Tab. 2 – 2007 ISTAT’s Regional unemployment rate (decreasing order) 
Total Men Women 
Sicily 13 Sicily 10.6 Sicily 17.3 
Campania 11.2 Campania 9.5 Puglia 15.5 
Puglia 11.2 Calabria 9.4 Basilicata 15.3 
Calabria 11.2 Puglia 9.0 Campania 14.6 
Sardinia 9.9 Sardinia 7.2 Calabria 14.5 
Basilicata 9.5 Molise 6.4 Sardinia 14.2 
Molise 8.1 Basilicata 6.3 Molise 10.9 
Lazio 6.4 Lazio 5.1 Abruzzo 9.8 
Abruzzo 6.2 Italy 4.9 Lazio 8.2 
Italy 6.1 Liguria 4.2 Italy 7.9 
Liguria 4.8 Abruzzo 3.9 Umbria 6.9 
Umbria 4.6 Piemonte 3.5 Toscana 6.3 
Toscana 4.3 Toscana 2.8 Marche 5.7 
Piemonte 4.2 Umbria 2.7 Liguria 5.2 
Marche 4.2 Marche 2.7 Piemonte 5.2 
Lombardia 3.4 Lombardia 2.6 Veneto 5.2 
Friuli V.G. 3.4 Valle d’Aosta 2.4 Friuli V. G. 4.7 
Veneto 3.3 Friuli V.G. 2.4 Lombardia 4.6 
Valle d’Aosta 3.2 Emilia Romagna 2.1 Valle d’Aosta 4.3 
Emilia Romagna 2.9 Veneto 2.0 Emilia Romagna 3.9 
Trentino A. A. 2.7 Trentino A. A. 1.9 Trentino a. A. 3.8 
Source: http://www.istat.it
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7. The Outgoing Labour Force Phenomena and the Post De-regulation 
“Inclusion” Problem 
The Svimez (2007) observed a dramatic increase in the outgoing labour 
force phenomena especially in the case of the “Mezzogiorno”. The phe-
nomenon is independent of the dynamic of employment which is similar to 
that of the rest of Italy. In 2006 the number of employed is increased by 
105,000 in the “Mezzogiorno” (+1,6% in a year) and 320,000 in the rest of 
Italy (+2% in a year).  
The very scarce opportunities to find a job in those areas produce an 
outflow of people from the status of (often temporary) employed to that of 
an outgoing labour force without passing through the status of unemployed. 
This holds even with the new, less binding, definitions of “people looking 
for a job”. Indeed, according to ISTAT’s RCFL, “job-searchers” are those 
(from 15 to 74 years old) who will be able to work within the two weeks of 
the interview and if they have demonstrated to be searching for a job with 
at least a simple action (even simply surfing the net) during the four weeks 
before the interview.
Tab. 3 – 2007 ISTAT’s Regional inactivity rate (decreasing order) 
Total Men Women 
Campania 50.7 Calabria 34.9 Campania  67.3 
Calabria 49.4 Campania 33.7 Sicily 64.8 
Sicily 48.7 Sicily 32.1 Puglia 64.5 
Puglia 47.4 Basilicata 30.7 Calabria 63.7 
Basilicata 45.2 Puglia 29.9 Basilicata 59.7 
Molise 41.7 Molise 28.9 Molise 54.6 
Sardinia 41.4 Sardinia 28.3 Sardinia 54.5 
Abruzzo 38.3 Abruzzo 25.6 Abruzzo 51.0 
Italy 37.5 Italy 25.6 Italy 49.3 
Lazio 36.2 Lazio 24.3 Lazio 47.6 
Liguria 33.0 Liguria 24.2 Veneto 43.0 
Marche 32.3 Umbria 24.2 Liguria 41.7 
Toscana 32.3 Piemonte 23.9 Marche 41.5 
Umbria 32.3 Toscana 23.8 Friuli V. G. 41.5 
Piemonte 32.2 Marche 23.2 Toscana 40.7 
Friuli V.G. 32.1 Friuli V.G. 22.9 Lombardia 40.7 
Veneto 31.9 Valle d’Aosta 21.9 Piemonte 40.5 
Lombardia 30.8 Lombardia 21.2 Umbria 40.4 
Trentino A.A. 30.0 Veneto 21.1 Trentino A. A. 39.7 
Valle d’Aosta 29.6 Trentino A. A. 20.6 Valle d’Aosta 37.7 
Emilia Romagna 27.6 Emilia Romagna 19.9 Emilia Romagna 35.4 
Source: http://www.istat.it 
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As Svimez (2007) observed, in 2006 fewer than 1 million (907,000) 
people were searching for a job in the “Mezzogiorno”; in 2000 there were 
about 500,000 more. Of these, half are in work and the other half are out-
side the labour force. This phenomenon has been accompanied by a de-
crease in unemployment in the same area of about 37% in the last six years 
(from 19% in 2000 to 12.3% in 2006). 
In the following table indicates of the persistent “inclusion” problem. 
7a) Migration 
In 2006, 270,000 people left the “Mezzogiorno” for the Centre-North of 
whom 150,000 only temporarily (Svimez, 2007). The figures of the phe-
nomenon relative to the period 2004-2007 are in the table below. The total 
is very close to that of the period of intense migration from the south of It-
aly to the north (1961-63) when it was of 295,000 (Svimez, 2007). 
However the difference between the two migration phenomena is far 
from slight; the permanent versus temporary nature has different causes and 
effects on individual leaving standards. 
Tab. 4a – Regional migration rates 2004-2007 (per 1,000 inhabitants) 
Internal migration  Migration from abroad 
2004 2005 2006 2007*  2004 2005 2006 2007* 
Piemonte 0.6 -0.1 0.5 -0.5  6.8 5.1 4.3 10.9 
Valle d’Aosta 3.3 4.9 3.2 2.1  4.5 4.8 4.1 5.7 
Lombardia 2.0 1.3 1.7 1.1  11.0 6.7 5.6 7.4 
Trentino-Alto Adige 2.5 1.8 1.7 1.8  6.4 6.3 5.8 6.6 
Veneto 1.5 1.2 1.4 0.9  9.3 6.8 5.8 8.4 
Friuli-Venezia Giulia 2.6 1.8 2.3 2.0  6.2 4.9 5.5 6.2 
Liguria 1.8 1.3 1.1 0.3  7.4 4.1 4.2 5.3 
Emilia-Romagna 4.9 4.3 4.5 3.6  9.2 6.9 5.9 8.3 
Toscana 2.3 1.7 2.3 1.2  7.9 6.0 5.2 8.7 
Umbria 2.7 2.9 2.2 1.5  9.2 7.3 5.1 9.7 
Marche 3.3 2.3 2.4 2.1  6.9 6.0 4.8 7.6 
Lazio 0.7 0.9 1.3 0.8  9.2 5.7 4.8 8.0 
Abruzzo 2.1 2.5 1.7 1.8  4.9 3.7 3.1 7.1 
Molise -0.5 -1.2 -0.5 0.1  2.1 2.2 2.0 4.0 
Campania -3.9 -4.4 -4.4 -4.3  4.0 1.5 1.3 3.2 
Puglia -2.1 -2.6 -2.4 -2.4  1.2 1.1 0.9 2.8 
Basilicata -3.1 -3.3 -3.6 -3.7  1.5 0.6 0.4 3.0 
Calabria -4.8 -4.3 -3.9 -3.9  1.5 1.0 0.3 7.0 
Sicily -2.3 -1.9 -1.5 -1.8  1.2 1.0 0.8 3.3 
Sardinia 0.8 0.6 1.0 0.2  1.0 1.1 1.0 2.6 
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Tab. 4b – Regional migration rates 2004-2007 (per 1,000 inhabitants) 
Other kind of migration Total migration 
2004 2005 2006 2007* 2004 2005 2006 2007* 
Piemonte 8.6 0.1 0.0 -0.3 16.0 5.2 4.8 10.1 
Valle d’Aosta -0.8 0.4 -0.6 -1.2 7.0 10.2 6.7 6.6 
Lombardia 1.7 -0.1 -1.0 -0.8 14.6 8.0 6.3 7.7 
Trentino-Alto Adige 0.9 0.1 -0.1 -0.6 9.8 8.2 7.4 7.8 
Veneto 0.3 -0.6 -0.8 -0.6 11.0 7.4 6.4 8.7 
Friuli-Venezia Giulia -0.2 -0.7 -1.4 -0.6 8.6 6.1 6.4 7.6 
Liguria 5.5 11.6 -1.2 -0.4 14.7 17.0 4.1 5.2 
Emilia-Romagna 4.8 -0.7 -0.5 -0.8 18.9 10.5 9.9 11.1 
Toscana 0.8 0.9 -0.1 1.0 11.1 8.6 7.4 10.9 
Umbria 2.6 2.7 0.5 -0.4 14.6 12.9 7.8 10.8 
Marche 0.2 -0.3 -1.1 -0.3 10.5 8.0 6.1 9.4 
Lazio 1.9 -0.2 28.1 -0.4 11.9 6.4 34.2 8.4 
Abruzzo 4.9 0.2 0.3 2.0 11.9 6.4 5.1 10.9 
Molise 2.0 -1.0 -0.6 -0.3 3.6 -0.1 0.9 3.8 
Campania 1.6 0.8 0.3 3.1 1.7 -2.1 -2.8 2.0 
Puglia 5.3 1.0 -0.2 -0.2 4.4 -0.5 -1.7 0.2 
Basilicata 1.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.4 -2.8 -3.3 -0.8 
Calabria 1.5 0.8 0.0 0.0 -1.8 -2.5 -3.6 3.1 
Sicily 1.7 1.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.5 0.0 -0.8 1.4 
Sardinia 2.6 2.3 0.6 0.3 4.4 3.9 2.6 3.1 
The temporary nature of the more recent phenomenon is essentially an 
effect of the liberalization and spread of temporary labour contracts and 
leases. In the past, full-time contracts, long-term leases and low rents (con-
trolled and frozen by policies) made people more aware of what they were 
doing when permanently settling down close to their workplaces. There is 
no more the full awareness of the past. 
7b) “On-the-job deaths” and fatal accidents  
“On-the-job deaths” phenomenon is spreading as another result of un-
controlled liberalization. Un-safety at work is also due to the excess turn-
over and the lack of training and experience of temporary employees. This 
emerges very clear on analysing US and UK extremely flexible labour 
market18.
18 A University of Illinois research paper analyzed 409 fatal accidents from 1990 to 
1997 in the San Francisco Bay area. A lack of experience interpreting real-time weather by 
low-time or “fair weather” pilots led to misdiagnosis of severity of the weather with fatal 
consequences. Even if paradoxically very trained pilots may be overconfident in their abili-
ties and do not fully appreciate the risks of flying into adverse weather. Indeed, much of pi-
lot training involves teaching pilots to feel confident in their ability to control the aircraft in 
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Eurispes’s Surveys of Occupational Accidents (2007) calculates that 
more people died at their workplace in Italy between 2003 and 2006 than 
among the coalition troops on the battlefield during the same period of the 
second Gulf War. In the period from April 2003 to April 2007 during the 
Gulf War, 3520 soldiers of the alliance died were 5252 people died at work 
in Italy from 2003 to 2006. An average of 1,376 people die each year in in-
dustrial or workplace accidents in Italy (see table below for details). Con-
sidering life expectancy (about 79 years) and the average age of workers 
who died (about 37 years), Eurispes measured that every death means 42 
years of life lost which multiplied by the number of fatalities, amounts to 
58,000 of years for ever lost to the “on-the-job death” phenomenon in 
2000-2006.  
Tab. 5 – Accident at work: Total and fatal accidents  
Years 













2003 54,215 670,494 8,031 732,740 121 1,196 9 1,326 
2004 52,593 657,395 8,487 718,475 160 1,059 6 1,225 
2005 50,485 631,194 8,362 690,041 118 994 11 1,123 
Women 
2003 17,164 209,748 17,542 244,454 8 112 3 123 
2004 16,670 212,044 19,540 248,254 15 78 10 103 
2005 15,801 213,658 20,066 249,525 9 71 3 83 
Total 
2003 71,379 880,242 25,573 977,194 129 1,308 12 1,449 
2004 69,263 869,439 28,027 966,729 175 1,137 16 1,328 
2005(*) 66,286 844,852 28,428 939,566 127 1,065 14 1,206 
Eurispes’s elaborations on the Inail’s Annual Report (2005) 
Most fatal accidents occur within the agriculture, construction, industry 
and transport sectors and in the northern regions of Lombardy and Emilia 
Romagna, Italy’s northern industrial heartland. According to a 2005 report 
by the International Labour Organisation (ILO), Italy has an annual fatality 
all flight regimes. However, an unfortunate by-product of this training may be a degree of 
overconfidence in one’s skill level and an unrealistic optimism about the chances of avoid-
ing harm through personal control that general aviation pilots exhibited both relatively low 
levels of risk awareness and generally high optimistic self-appraisals of abilities and judg-
ment. A recent survey reveals that health and safety is afforded considerable attention by 
many companies in the United Kingdom, although smaller organizations are less likely to 
have positive attitudes towards related issues or strategies. This is a significant finding, giv-
en that workplace fatalities, injuries and “lost days” due to illness or injury remain high de-
spite the UK’s comparatively good health and safety record within the EU and recent legis-
lative developments.  
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rate of 6.9 per 100,000 workers, the second highest of the 15 member states 
within the study. The rate – calculated by dividing the number who die at 
work by the number of employed – is also far higher than the rates in both 
France (3.0) and the UK (0.8). The death toll among them is particularly 
high – they account for some 11% of those who died between 2002 and 
2006, according to the Eurispes study, even though they account for less 
than 5% of Italy’s population. On a deeper level, experts agree that the 
higher rates are intrinsically linked to Italy’s vast underground black and 
criminal economy. There is a great problem with illegal working and a se-
ries of cascading contracts that are won by large firms are then split into 
smaller sub-contracts, which are awarded to smaller firms, who, in turn, 
split the jobs into even smaller sub-contracts. At each step the worker is 
less protected. The frequency of fatalities at work, known in Italy as “white 
deaths”, is considered a national scandal in one of the Group of Seven (G7) 
rich nations. International Labour Organisation data show the rate of work-
place deaths in Italy is more than 40 percent higher than in France, nearly 
twice as high as Germany’s and seven times as high as in Britain. The 
structure of Italy’s economy and labour market makes it a breeding ground 
for such tragedies: it has a huge underground economy, high illegal immi-
gration and a prevalence of companies relying on a low cost base and tem-
porary, often immigrant, staff. A National Day for Work Victims is held 
every year in October, but the fatalities continue and are now well past 500 




Italy introduced a tax reform package in 1996-1998 ranging from tax 
administration and tax compliance to local taxation. Reform of business 
and capital income taxation were the most important innovations. One aim 
was to increase the financial and real neutrality of corporate taxation. The 
Italian corporate sector tax system was based on the corporate profit tax of 
37% (IRPEG) and on a local income tax of 16.2% not deductible from the 
former tax base (ILOR) wealth tax on net worth (0.75%). This system was 
seen as an obstacle to the development of capital markets and hence as an 
important factor in explaining the central role of the banking system in fi-
19 Some of the observations made in this section are taken from M. Bordignon, Giannini 
S., Panteghini P. (2000), Reforming Business Taxation: Lessons from Italy. WP of the So-
cietà Italiana di Economia Pubblica.
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nancing production and the high debt-equity ratio of Italian firms. Tax 
avoidance, tax evasion and tax planning operations (shifting of profits 
where there are lower tax rates) are too often the answers. Thus the tax sys-
tem is regarded as a major obstacle to investment, innovation and growth in 
the country. 
The aim of the 1998 tax reform was therefore to reduce the tax rate on 
profits and the wide gap between debt and equity finance. After the reform 
corporate sector taxes were as follows: the regional tax of 4.25% on valued 
added (IRAP) and the Dual Income Tax (DIT). DIT is set at a rate of 19% 
on “ordinary income”, representing the opportunity cost of using equity 
capital both in the form of new subscription and retained earnings and 37% 
on residual profits, and a rate of 37% on “extra-profits”. IRAP is a new re-
gional tax on all business and self employment activities, with a very large 
tax base computed annually and not deducible from the tax base of either 
IRPEF or IRPEG (IRES since 2004).  
The value added tax base is made of three main components: labour 
costs, interests on debts and pre-tax profits. It is defined specifically for dif-
ferent business categories. Generally, the IRAP base is the accounting dif-
ference between revenue from sales and the cost of intermediate goods and 
services. As labour costs and interest payments are not deductible from the 
tax base, the IRAP base is nearly equal to the budget sum of wages, profits, 
rents and interest payments.  
This new tax implies a significant movement towards fiscal decentrali-
sation, as revenues from IRAP go directly to regions where the productive 
activity is performed. The regional distribution of the revenues from the 
IRAP collection is based on the labour cost component. This is a solution to 
the probable multi-regional localization of profit and interest components. 
Since 2001 the regions also have the possibility of varying the tax rate by 
up to 1% above or below the base level of 4.25%, discriminating among 
sectors and activities. Interest payments were completely untaxed before 
IRAP. By disallowing interest payment deductibility IRAP introduces a 
positive tax wedge between gross and net returns that is on a debt-financed 
marginal investment. However, by taxing interest at the business level the 
introduction of IRAP allowed a sharp reduction in the average rate of taxa-
tion on profits and reduced the advantage for debt financing at firm level.  
Moreover, by widening the tax base and including even labour costs, the 
IRAP transformed a large social contribution into a reduction of the tax bur-
den on business as it substituted the mandatory contribution to the National 
Health Service. Its revenues will mainly serve the regional health services. 
Some aspects of IRAP have raised considerable criticism for their dis-
tributive effects. The overall tax burden of manufacturing firms decreased 
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by 2.4% in 1998 (Confindustria, 1999). The burden of taxation was shifted 
to non-corporate and professional sectors, thereby penalising firms in less 
developed regions, like, the Mezzogiorno, which have low profitability and 
high debt-to-equity ratios and are strictly dependent on the local banking 
system (Bontempi et al., 1998).  
9. The Wages Downward Drift and the Debate on the Fiscal Wedge on 
Wages
Faini and Gagliarducci (2005) presented the following table to illustrate 
the dramatic the slowdown of real wages.  
Tab. 6 
  Wages per units of 
work
CPI Real wages 
(Total CPI) 
Real Wages  
(C. CPI). 
N. C.  P.S. Total  C. N. C. P.S. Total C.
1996 2,3 - 4 3,9 0,6 - 0,6 - 
1997 4,3 4 2 1,8 2,2 2,0 2,4 2,2 
1998 2,4 2,4 2 1,8 1,2 1,2 1,3 1,3 
1999 1,8 1,4 1,7 1,7 1,1 0,8 1,1 0,8 
2000 2 2 2,6 2,5 0,8 0,8 0,8 0,8 
2001 2,4 3 2,8 2,8 0,9 1,1 0,9 1,1 
2002 2,1 2,3 2,5 2,3 0,8 0,9 0,9 1,0 
2003 2,2 2,1 2,7 2,5 0,8 0,8 0,9 0,8 
Source: ISTAT. N.C. = national contracts including public sector; P.S. = estimate private 
sector; CPI = Consumption Price Index; P.S. = only private sector of industry and services; 
C. CPI = CPI for white and blue collar families.  
Mario Draghi, Governor of the Bank of Italy, has recently highlighted 
the very low level of real wages and the worrying decline in purchasing 
power and living standards. It has been widely suggested that the main cul-
prit is the fiscal wedge on wages: de-regulation of the labour market and 
consequential excess turnover may have lessened workers’ bargaining 
power so much that firms have became able to transfer any increase in the 
fiscal wedge by lowering wages paid. 
What sounds strange is that, as Gallegati and Richiardi (2008) observe, 
according to the OECD the fiscal wedge for employees has slightly de-
creased (from 46.4% in 2000, to 45% in 2003 and the current 45.9% for a 
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single wage-earner with a medium pay). Hence it is not the fiscal wedge 
which is the cause of the downward wage drift. Moreover, the authors 
maintain that the correlation between net wages and the tax burden is very 
weak in EU (of about -0.2). 
A further curiosity lies in its definition as the fiscal wedge is not entirely 
made up of taxes. The fiscal wedge on wages is the differences between 
firm labour costs and worker net retribution20. It is made of different com-
ponents: 
a) the IRAP, a regional tax with the labour cost in its tax base while de-
ducible from IRPEG (IRES since 2004); 
b) the national social security contributions, that is the insurance premium 
paid (both employers and employees) in percentage with respect to pay-
ment to INPS to care for dependent relatives and insure against any kind 
of risk (maternity, health disease, injury, death and unemployment);  
a) the contributions to pensions, that is a deferred retribution. When re-
duced, this is a tantamount to stealing workers’ money (Leombruni and 
Richiardi, 2006); 
b) IRPEF, which is a national progressive tax on net remuneration for 
which employers are only withholding agents. 
To reduce the fiscal wedge, policy may cut taxes – namely IRPEF and 
IRAP –, narrow their tax base or cut employers’ and/or employees’ contri-
butions.
10. Conclusions
De-regulation of the Italian labour market, far from solving the prob-
lems of a dual economy, has reinforced them and now that de-regulation is 
very near to completion a “Mission for Flexicurity” has been launched by 
European Commission. 
Duality between typical and atypical workers, but even between men 
and women, as far as labour protection law is concerned, is no proper solu-
tion to the “inclusion” problem which still characterises the country. Atypi-
cal new entrants in the labour market have to cope with excessive job turn-
over and insecurity. Employment protection legislation and the welfare 
state had to be considered as civil rights to protect men and women from 
old age, illness, exclusion, penury, untimely death, “on-the-job death”. 
20 As labour cost is the sum of gross annual wages, employer contributions and IRAP, 
take-home remuneration is the sum of net retribution (i.e. gross annual wage minus IRPEF, 
workers’ contribution) and family allowances, the fiscal wedge is the sum of employer and 
worker contribution’s, IRAP, IRPEF. 
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Deprivation of these civil rights, resulting from the de-regulation of the la-
bour market, is a departure from standards of health and morality.  
As regards duality between employers and employees the L-N-J “battle 
of mark-ups” is definitely lost by employees: the wage curve is decaying 
and loosing its meaning; unemployment rate may be regarded as a com-
parative minor source of variation of earnings with respect to “inside” fac-
tors. We found that, as far as “firm” factor is concerned, the coefficient on 
unemployment is decreasing in that of firm-specific value added. The effect 
of firm-specific factors on wages (inside factors), like the value-added, 
profitability, distance from full-capacity, is a clear sign that non-compen-
sating wage differentials are at work. Wages are not set to clear the market. 
The increasing importance of “inside” factors is, thus, a sign that the re-
forms of Italian labour market have not succeeded in increasing labour 
market competition for, of course, in a competitive labour market firm-
specific factors have no role to play.  
Moreover the signals that “inside” factors like human capital variables 
(namely education and job experience) have become predominant with re-
spect to “outside” ones (namely local unemployment rate) could have been 
judged positive if they had not been associated with the kind of change in 
the composition of the labour force produced by de-regulation. The new, 
for ever less skilled and protected “quasi-employees” or “quasi-unem-
ployed” are objectively considered as “employed” by the new definitions in 
labour force collection even if they work for free and/or for very short term. 
The increasing outgoing labour force phenomena due to discouragement, 
migration and “on-the – job deaths” is still too much ignored.  
What are then the effects on firms and growth? Neither “tax planning 
operations” (shifting of profits where there are lower tax rates) nor “silent 
internationalization” of SMEs (Bugamelli, Cipollone and Infante, 2000, 
Ginzburg, 2005) have been successfully halted. The structural problems 
evidenced by the Svimez (2007) are very far to be solved. The development 
of Mezzogiorno is, still, severely compromised by a hostile territory af-
fected by social insecurity and a high crime rate (obviously increased by 
“inclusion” problems in the labour market); lack of infrastructures (namely 
roads, railways lines, airports, ports, …) and services (schools, hospitals, …), 
scarce diffusion of technology and services for firms and credit rationing 
(even reinforced by the local effect of the new Basel Agreements).  
It is difficult to understand how these problems could be solved, rather 
than consolidated, by the widespread insecurity produced by the recent re-
forms. Excessive turnover of workers and firms, strengthened by the recent 
reforms, are severe obstacles to human capital accumulation. A hostile ter-
ritory produces social inequality, poverty and under-consumption that se-
85 
verely compromise growth. All these shortcomings can only be worsened by 
a further cut of the “fiscal wedge” that will be probably brought about by 
dismantling the national social security and pension systems as the tax com-
ponent of the wedge have already been cut or narrowed by the last govern-
ment’s financial acts. Besides, in this situation, reproposed “wage cages” 
(gabbie salariali) have no meaning in the solution of the “inclusion” problem. 




LRW = Natural logarithm of deflated per-employee firm labour cost; National 
Consumer Price Index (1995 = 100) is used for deflation 
LYD = Natural logarithm of deflated individual household labour income (net 
wages, salaries and fringe benefits); National Consumer Price Index (1995 = 100) 
is used for deflation 
Regressors: 
LDVAE = Natural logarithm of deflated per-employee firm value-added; National 
Consumer Price Index (1995 = 100) is used for deflation 
LRUNR = Natural logarithm of regional unemployment rate 
LINDPT = Natural logarithm of permanent part-time workers  
LDETFU = Natural logarithm of temporary full-time workers  
LDETPT = Natural logarithm of temporary part-time workers  
LTRAINE = Natural logarithm of “with training” contract employees  
(formazione-lavoro) 
LQUASIE = Natural logarithm of quasi-employees (co.co.co)
LCASUALE = Natural logarithm of casual-employees (occasionali) 
LHIREDE = Natural logarithm of hired workers (interinali) 
LEXTRAE = Natural logarithm of non-EU workers 
LCOMPED = Natural logarithm of employees with compulsory education  
LSDIPL = Natural logarithm of employees with secondary-school diploma 
LUDCERT = Natural logarithm of employees with University degree certificate 
LREDE = Natural logarithm of employees in R&D 
LPROFC = Natural logarithm of employees engaged in professional course 
LENTRPR = Natural logarithm of entrepreneurs  
LFAMAN = Natural logarithm of family managers 
LEXMAN = Natural logarithm of external managers 
LMIDMAN = Natural logarithm of middle-ranking managers 
LWHITEC = Natural logarithm of white-collars 
LSBLUEC = Natural logarithm of skilled blue-collars 
LUBLUEC = Natural logarithm of unskilled blue-collars 
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Time dummy variables (each year = 1; other years = 0)  
YEAR1 = 2001 (benchmark) 
YEAR2 = 2002 
YEAR3 = 2003 
Regional dummy variables (each region = 1; other regions = 0)  
Mezzogiorno: 
ABR = Abruzzo 
BAS = Basilicata 
CAL = Calabria 
CAM = Campania 
MOL = Molise 
PUG = Puglia 
SAR = Sardinia 
SIC = Sicily 
Centre-North: 
LAZ = Lazio 
MAR = Marche 
TOS = Toscana 
UMB = Umbria 
ER = Emilia Romagna 
VEN = Veneto 
TAA = Trentino Alto Adige 
FRI = Friuli Venezia Giulia 
LOM = Lombardia 
PIE = Piemonte 
LIG = Liguria 
VDA = Valle d’Aosta (benchmark) 
Pavitt sectors dummy variables (each sector = 1; other sectors = 0)  
Pavitt1 = traditional-sector 
Pavitt2 = scale-sector 
Pavitt3 = Specialised suppliers 
Pavitt4 = High-technology (benchmark) 
Size classes dummy variables (each size class = 1; other classes = 0)  
EDIM1 = 11-20 employees 
EDIM2 = 21-50 employees 
EDIM3 = 51-250 employees 
EDIM4 = 251-499 employees 
EDIM5 =  500 employees (benchmark) 
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Household characteristics for Bank of Italy’s database 
Gender: man/woman 
Qualifications: Q1 = blue collar, Q2 = office worker or school teacher, Q3 = cadre 
or manager; Q4 = sole proprietor/member of the arts and professions, Q5 = other 
self-employed; Q6 = retired; Q7 = other not employed (benchmark). 
Marital status: M1 = married; M2 = single; M3 = divorced or separated; M4 = 
widow (benchmark) 
Education level: E1 = none; E2 = primary school; E3 = junior secondary school; 
E4 = professional school (three years); E5 = secondary school; E6 = three-year 
graduation; E7 = graduated; E8 = post-graduation specialization (benchmark) 
Statistical Appendix 
Analyses were conducted using the procedures for panel data models in which a 
large number of cross-section observations is observed for a certain period. Be-
sides, since not all the individuals are present every year the procedures are those 
for unbalanced panels (a review of these models and techniques may be found in 
Greene, 1990; 1995; 1997).  
The estimation models are as follows: 
(1) The classic regression model or Ordinary Least Squares model (OLS) 
yi t = P + E‘x i t + Hi t  
i = 1, …., n ; t = 1, …, T ; E [Hi t ] = 0 and VAR[Hi t] = V2H
(2) The Least Squares Dummy Variable Model (LSDV) 
yi t = i Di + E‘x i t + Hi t = D 1 d1i t + D 2 d2 i t + … + E‘x i t + Hi t 
(3) The one-way random effect model (REM) 
yi t = D + E‘x i t + Hi t + ui   
E [ui ] = E [Hi t ] = 0 , VAR[Hit] = V2H, VAR[ui] = V2u , E[Hi t , uj] = 0,  
E[Hi t , H j s] = 0, E[ui , uj] = 0 (i zj, tzs)
E [Hi t + ui ] = 0; VAR[Hi t + ui] = V2 = (V2H + V2u); but, for a given i, the disturbances 
in different periods are correlated by virtue of their common component, 
CORR[Hi t + ui, Hi S + ui ] = U = V2u / V2
(4) The least squares dummy variable model or two-way fixed effect model 
yi t = D0 + Di + J t + E‘x i t + Hi
6 i Di = 6 t J t = 0
E [Hi t ] = E [ui ] = E [J t ]= 0 ,  
E [Hi t , uj] = E [Hi t , J s] = E [uj , J t]= 0 , for all i, j, t, s 
VAR[Hi t ] = V2H , COV[Hi t , HjS] = 0, for alli t, j, t, s, 
VAR[ui] = V2u , COV[ui , uj] = 0, for all i, j
VAR[J t ] = V2 J , COV[Jt , Js] = 0, for all t, s 
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Model (1) is a classical regression model that does not consider the “group-wise” 
nature of the data. The method of ordinary least squares (OLS) provides consistent 
and efficient estimates of parameters P and E. Model (2) is a one-way fixed effects 
model; it is a classical regression model in which the differences among cross-
section units are captured by differences in the constant terms using dummy vari-
ables. The least square dummy variable (LSDV) is the estimation approach; it is a 
partitioned ordinary least squares approach with N group specific constants. In the 
paper a fixed regional effect model is estimated; it assumes that regional effects (f r)
are fixed, that is differences among regional groups are captured by R constant 
terms (see also Baltagi and Blien, 1998).  
In the case of the “one-way” random effect model (3), instead, the individual ef-
fects are modelled as specific disturbances randomly distributed among the cross-
section units. It is a generalized regression model. The efficient estimator is the 
generalized least squares (GLS) (method of generalized least squares). The econo-
metric software used (LIMDEP) uses a two-step procedure. In the first step the re-
gression is estimated by the OLS or the LSDV methods. In the second step, after 
estimating the two variance components (V2H and V2u) by means of the residuals 
from the first regression, the GLS or FGLS (feasible general least squares) are ob-
tained regressing (yi t – Ty i .) on (1 – T) and (xi t – Tx i .) where T = (1- VH/V2) and V22 =
V2H + T V2u. In the paper a random regional effect model is estimated; it assumes 
that regional effects (f r) are distributed as random variables. 
Model (4) is a two-way fixed effects model; T – 1 dummy variables are added to 
model (2) to capture fixed time effects. Model (5) is a two-way random effects 
model; time effects are modelled as randomly distributed disturbances; Fueller and 
Battese (1974) developed the FGLS method for the two-way REM. 
The panel data may be unbalanced in both directions: neither the number of time peri-
ods observed for each group, nor the number of groups observed in each period need 
to be fixed. To use two-way FEM or REM the data need only consist of a sample of 
observations indexed by both group and time. But if there are time-invariant regres-
sors, such as gender or region, it is impossible to compute the fixed effect estimator 
and the group-wise nature of the data must be captured by the random effect models.  
The Tests: 
I. Test statistics for the various classic models: 
A) For models 1 to 5, the log-likelihood function, sum of squared residuals based 
on the least squares estimates, and R2 are calculated 
1. yi t = D + Hi t    
2. yi t = D i + Hi t   
3. yi t = D + E‘x i t + Hi t
4. yi t = D i + E‘x i t + Hi t    
5. yi t = D0 + Di + J t + E‘x i t + Hi t 
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B) Chi-squared statistics based on likelihood functions (Likelihood Ratio test) and 
F statistics based on the sums of squares for testing the constraints of:  
- Model 1. on 2. (no group effect on the mean of y), 
- Model 1. on 3. (no fit in the regression of y on x’s), 
- Model 1. on 4. (no group effects or fit in regression), 
- Model 2. on 4. (group effects but no fit in regression), 
- Model 3. on 4. (fit in regression but no group effects), 
- Model 4. on 5. (fit in regression, group effects but no time effects), 
- Model 3. on 5. (fit in regression but no group and time effects). 
The statistics, degrees of freedom and probability value (probability that the statis-
tic would be equalled or exceeded by the chi-squared or F random variable) are 
given for each hypothesis. 
II. Two specification test statistics: 
Breusch and Pagan’s Lagrange multiplier statistic for testing the REM model 
against model 3. above and Hausman’s chi-squared statistic for testing the REM 
model against the FEM model. Probability values and degrees of freedom are 
given for both statistics.  
Lagrange Multiplier test of Breusch-Pagan (1979)  
Under the null hypothesis of homoschedasticity (H0 = V2i = V) the LM test is dis-
tributed asymptotically as a chi-squared distribution with a number of degrees of 
freedom equal to the number of involved regressors. The rejection of the null hy-
pothesis points out the dominance of REM versus the classical regression model 3 
(H1 = V2i = V (a + b xi)).  
Therefore, large values of the LM statistic argue in favour of REM against the 
classical regression with no (group and/or time) specific effects.  
Hausman’s test (1978)  
The test is founded on the fact that the random model it considers the individual 
effects as random disturbances and, hence, not correlated to the regressores. Rejec-
tion of the null hypothesis points to the prevalence of the fixed effects model.  
However, if there are time-invariant regressors the “two-way” model to be 
estemated will inevitably be the random one. 
Therefore large values of the Hausman’s statistic argue in favour of the fixed effects 
model over the random effects model. 
In the case of unbalanced panels heteroschedasticity can arise due to the different 
group size (groupwise heteroscedasticity). This does not constitute a real problem 
since the LIMDEP automatically considers the different group size provided that 
indicators of group size and periods are first constructed. In the presence of hetero-
schedasticity both the adjusted OLSs and the GLSs or FGLS can be used.  
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Abstract 
The Italian Wage Curve. The Effects of the Recent Labour Market Reforms
The paper examines some effects of the recent reforms aimed at increasing flexibility in 
the Italian labour market. It shows their incapability to respond to the “inclusion” problem 
which still characterises the country. New temporary low-skill jobs were created but the re-
forms have neither enforced industrial competitiveness nor increased productivity. Far from 
solving the problems of a dual economy, de-regulation of Italian labour market has rein-
forced them and has concurrently eroded civil rights thereby making a departure form stan-
dards of health and morality. Excessive turnover of workers and firms is a major obstacle to 
human capital accumulation. A hostile territory produces social inequality, poverty and un-
der-consumption that severely compromises growth. 
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